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Upper bounds of a class of imperfect quantum sealing protocols
Guang-Ping He
Department of Physics and Advanced Research Center,
Zhongshan University, Guangzhou 510275, China
The model of the quantum protocols sealing a classical bit is studied. It is shown that there
exist upper bounds on its security. For any protocol where the bit can be read correctly with the
probability α, and reading the bit can be detected with the probability β, the upper bounds are
β 6 1/2 and α+ β 6 9/8.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Data sealing is a cryptographic problem between two
parties. A sender (Alice) stores some secret data in a
certain form, so that any other reader (Bob) can read
it without Alice’s helping. Meanwhile, if the data has
been read, it should be detectable by Alice[1]. A com-
mon example of classical data sealing is closing a letter
in an envelop with a wafer of molten wax, into which was
pressed the distinctive seal of the sender.
Like all other classical cryptographic protocols, it is in-
teresting to find the quantum version of data sealing for
better security. Bechmann-Pasquinucci [2] first proposed
a protocol which seals a classical bit with a three-qubit
state. Singh and Srikanth[3] extended the idea into a
many-qubit majority voting scheme, and associated it
with secret sharing to improve the security. Chau[4] pre-
sented a protocol which seals quantum data with quan-
tum error correcting code. The protocol for sealing a
classical string was also proposed[5].
However, as pointed out by the author himself, the
protocol in Ref.[2] is insecure against collective measure-
ments. More general, it was further proven[6] that perfect
quantum sealing of a classical bit is impossible in princi-
ple. If a protocol allows the bit to be perfectly retrievable
by the reader, then collective measurements exist which
can read the bit without disturbing the corresponding
quantum state. It means that Bob can always read the
bit without being detected by Alice. In fact, the proto-
col for sealing quantum data cannot be used for sealing
a classical bit either. This is because the quantum states
used for encoding the bits 0 and 1 respectively are or-
thogonal to each other. They can be distinguished by
collective measurements without any disturbance too.
Therefore, it is natural to ask whether imperfect quan-
tum sealing of a classical bit is possible. Here “imperfect”
means that the sealed bit b is not perfectly retrievable in
the protocol. Bob can only read b correctly with the
probability α < 1, while reading b can be detected with
the probability β. Obviously a protocol with α = 1 is a
perfect one. But if there exists a protocol in which both
α and β are less than but very close to 1, it is still very
valuable for practical usage.
Nevertheless, in this paper it will be shown that upper
bounds exist for α and β. If Bob uses collective measure-
ments instead of the honest operations to read b, then the
upper bounds are β 6 1/2 and α+ β 6 9/8. This result
actually bounds the power of practical quantum sealing
of a classical bit. In the next section we will establish
a general model of imperfect quantum sealing protocols.
Basing on the model, the upper bounds will be obtained
in Section III. In Section IV some examples of imperfect
protocols are studied. The impacts of the result will be
discussed in the last section.
II. THE MODEL
First let us establish the model of imperfect quantum
sealing protocols, on which the discussion in this paper
is based. Note that here and in the following content,
when speaking of quantum sealing protocols, we means
the protocols for sealing a classical bit only, except where
noted. The details of the data sealing process is not im-
portant to our discussion, but the ending of the protocol
generally has the following features:
(1) Bob knows an operation P ;
(2) Bob owns a quantum system Ψ (Ψ may not be in
the eigenstate of P . Otherwise the protocol becomes a
perfect one);
(3) Alice lets Bob know two sets G0, G1 (G0∩G1 = ∅),
such that if he applies P on Ψ and the outcome is g ∈ G0
(g ∈ G1), he should take the value of the sealed bit as
b′ = 0 (b′ = 1); while if g /∈ G0∪G1, the sealed bit cannot
be identified, i.e. Bob needs to guess b′ randomly by
himself. Note that since Ψ may not be in the eigenstate
of P , the value of b′ thus obtained will match Alice’s
input b with a probability α only;
(4) Alice owns a quantum system Φ entangled with Ψ.
And she knows that the initial state of the system Φ⊗Ψ
is |φ⊗ ψ〉;
(5) At any time Alice can access to the entire system
Φ⊗Ψ and compare its state |φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉 with |φ⊗ ψ〉. Thus
she can detect whether b has been read with the proba-
bility β = 1− |〈φ⊗ ψ| φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉|2.
Note that in the protocols previously proposed (e.g.
Refs.[2, 3]), Alice does not own the system Φ described
above, and the case g /∈ G0∪G1 generally will not occur.
But to make our result as general as possible so that it
may cover other protocols potentially existed, we include
2these features in the model. Obviously previous protocols
are only the special cases of the model where the entan-
glement between Φ and Ψ has already collapsed before
the end of the protocol, and G0, G1 cover all possible
outcomes of g.
III. THE UPPER BOUNDS
Let H be the global Hilbert space constructed by all
possible states of Ψ. {|eˆi〉} denotes a basis of H , which
is the eigenvector set of the operation P . It can be di-
vided into three orthogonal subsets {
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
}, {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
} and
{
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
}, such that ∀ |ψ〉 ∈ {
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
} (∀ |ψ〉 ∈ {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
}),
applying P on |ψ〉 will lead to b′ = 0 (b′ = 1); and
∀ |ψ〉 ∈ {
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
} will lead to b′ = 0 and b′ = 1 with the
equal probability 1/2. H is consequently divided into
three subspaces H0, H1 and H2, whose eigenvector sets
are {
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
}, {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
} and {
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
} respectively.
Though the subspaces H0, H1 and H2 are orthogonal
to each other, the quantum states used for encoding the
bits 0 and 1 respectively need not to be orthogonal in an
imperfect quantum sealing protocol. Instead, any state in
H could be the state of the system Ψ. That is, the state
of Ψ may contain the vectors from different subspaces, so
that the states used for encoding 0 and 1 may overlap. In
this case, the cheating strategy in the impossibility proof
of perfect quantum sealing can not be successful with the
probability 1.
However, note that {
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
}, {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
} and {
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
}
form a complete basis of H . Let |φ0 ⊗ ψ0〉 (|φ1 ⊗ ψ1〉)
denotes the initial state of Φ⊗Ψ when Alice want to seal
b = 0 (b = 1). It can always be expanded as
|φb ⊗ ψb〉 =
√
α
(0)
b
∑
i
√
λ
(0)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (0)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
+
√
α
(1)
b
∑
i
√
λ
(1)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (1)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
+
√
α
(2)
b
∑
i
√
λ
(2)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (2)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
, (1)
with α
(0)
b +α
(1)
b +α
(2)
b = 1,
∑
i
λ
(0)
b,i =
∑
i
λ
(1)
b,i =
∑
i
λ
(2)
b,i = 1
(sum over all possible i within each corresponding sub-
space), b = 0, 1. All
∣∣∣fˆi
〉
are the vectors describing the
state of Φ, which are not required to be orthogonal to
each other.
With such initial states, it can be seen that the maxi-
mal probability for Bob to read b correctly (i.e. his out-
come b′ matches Alice’s input b) is
α = [(α
(0)
0 + α
(2)
0 /2) + (α
(1)
1 + α
(2)
1 /2)]/2. (2)
Consider a dishonest Bob who does not use P but
the following strategy to read b. Define two operators
Pj =
∑
i
∣∣∣eˆ(j)i
〉〈
eˆ
(j)
i
∣∣∣ (sum over all possible i within Hj .
j = 0, 1), which are the collective measurements project-
ing the quantum state into the subspaces H0 and H1
respectively. Bob randomly chooses to apply either P0
or P1 on Ψ with the equal probability 1/2. If his choice
is Pj and Ψ can be projected to the subspace Hj success-
fully, he takes b′ = j; else if the projection fails, he always
takes b′ = j¯ without further measurements on the quan-
tum state. That is, he never makes further attempts to
distinguish the state between the two subspaces Hj¯ and
H2. It can be shown that with this strategy, Bob can also
reach the maximized α in Eq.(2). Now let us calculate
the probability β for the reading to be detected by Alice.
There can be four different cases:
(1) Bob’s choice is P0, and the initial state of Φ ⊗ Ψ
is |φ⊗ ψ〉 = |φ0 ⊗ ψ0〉. From Eq.(1) it can be seen that
Ψ can be projected into H0 successfully with the proba-
bility α
(0)
0 . Meanwhile, Φ ⊗ Ψ collapses to |φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉 =∑
i
√
λ
(0)
0,i
∣∣∣fˆ (0)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
. It can be viewed as the initial
state with the probability p0s = |〈φ⊗ ψ| φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉|2 =
α
(0)
0 . Therefore Alice can detect the disturbance of the
state with the probability
β0s = 1− p0s = 1− α(0)0 . (3)
On the other hand, the projection can also fail
with the probability α
(1)
0 + α
(2)
0 , with Φ ⊗ Ψ col-
lapsing to |φ′ ⊗ ψ′〉 = (
√
α
(1)
0
∑
i
√
λ
(1)
0,i
∣∣∣fˆ (1)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
+√
α
(2)
0
∑
i
√
λ
(2)
0,i
∣∣∣fˆ (2)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
)/
√
α
(1)
0 + α
(2)
0 . It can be
viewed as the initial state with the probability p0f =
α
(1)
0 + α
(2)
0 . Therefore Alice can detect the disturbance
with the probability
β0f = 1− p0f = 1− α(1)0 − α(2)0 . (4)
Altogether, in this case reading b can be detected by
Alice with the probability
β0 = α
(0)
0 β0s + (α
(1)
0 + α
(2)
0 )β0f
= 2α
(0)
0 (1 − α(0)0 ). (5)
Here the condition α
(0)
0 + α
(1)
0 + α
(2)
0 = 1 is used.
(2) Bob’s choice is P0, and the initial state of Φ ⊗ Ψ
is |φ⊗ ψ〉 = |φ1 ⊗ ψ1〉. Similar to the analysis above,
in this case reading b can be detected by Alice with the
probability
β1 = 2α
(0)
1 (1− α(0)1 ). (6)
(3) Bob’s choice is P1, and the initial state is |φ⊗ ψ〉 =
|φ0 ⊗ ψ0〉. Similar to Eq.(5), the detecting probability is
β′0 = 2α
(1)
0 (1− α(1)0 ). (7)
3(4) Bob’s choice is P1, and the initial state is |φ⊗ ψ〉 =
|φ1 ⊗ ψ1〉. Similar to Eq.(6), the detecting probability is
β′1 = 2α
(1)
1 (1− α(1)1 ). (8)
In all, the average probability for Alice to detect the
reading is
β = [α
(0)
0 (1 − α(0)0 ) + α(0)1 (1 − α(0)1 )
+α
(1)
0 (1− α(1)0 ) + α(1)1 (1− α(1)1 )]/2. (9)
The right-hand side of this equation reaches its maximum
when α
(0)
0 = α
(0)
1 = α
(1)
0 = α
(1)
1 = 1/2 and α
(2)
0 = α
(2)
0 =
0. Thus the upper bound for β is
β 6 1/2. (10)
Combining Eqs.(2) and (9), we have
α+ β = [α
(0)
0 (3/2− α(0)0 ) + α(1)0 (1/2− α(1)0 )
+α
(1)
1 (3/2− α(1)1 ) + α(0)1 (1/2− α(0)1 )
+1]/2. (11)
The right-hand side of this equation reaches its maximum
when α
(0)
0 = α
(1)
1 = 3/4, α
(1)
0 = α
(0)
1 = 1/4 and α
(2)
0 =
α
(2)
0 = 0. Thus we obtain another upper bound
α+ β 6 9/8. (12)
IV. EXAMPLES
A. Breaking the majority voting scheme
Here we give an example on how the above cheating
strategy is applied to an embodied protocol.
In Ref.[3] a compound scheme was proposed, which
embeds a majority voting quantum sealing scheme in a
classical secret sharing scheme. As pointed out by the
authors, the entire scheme is secure since the secret shar-
ing scheme prevents any single reader from possessing all
the qubits to perform collective measurements. Without
the secret sharing scheme, as it will be shown below, the
majority voting scheme alone is insecure.
The majority voting scheme is defined as follows. To
seal a classical bit b, Alice prepares n qubits. fn (f <
1/2) qubits called the code qubits are prepared in the
state |b〉. The other (1−f)n qubits called the seal qubits
are put randomly in any eigenstate of the diagonal ba-
sis |±〉 ≡ (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. To read the bit b, an honest
Bob is supposed to measure each qubit in the computa-
tional basis {|0〉 , |1〉}. He takes b = 0 (or 1) if more than
n/2 qubits are found as |0〉 (or |1〉). Since f < 1/2, we
can see that the states encoding 0 and 1 are nonorthog-
onal to each other. Bob stands a nonzero probability of
misreading the bit. Therefore it is an imperfect sealing
scheme.
The cheating strategy to this scheme is exactly the
one described in the previous section. Let w(c) denote
the weight (the number of the bit 1) of a classical binary
n-bit string c. The eigenvector set {|eˆi〉} in the present
case is the computational basis {|c〉} of the global Hilbert
space H , where c runs through all possible classical n-
bit strings. Its three orthogonal subsets are defined as
{
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
} ≡ {|c〉 |w(c) < n/2}, {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
} ≡ {|c〉 |w(c) >
n/2} and {
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
} ≡ {|c〉 |w(c) = n/2}. The three sub-
spaces H0, H1 and H2 are consequently defined by these
subsets.
For simplicity let us consider the case where n is odd
so that {
∣∣∣eˆ(2)i
〉
} = ∅. Let |ψb〉 be the state of the n-qubit
system encoding b. For any |ψb〉 with fn code qubits,
we can expand all the (1− f)n seal qubits in the compu-
tational basis. Thus |ψb〉 is expanded into N ≡ 2(1−f)n
items, of which M (b¯) ≡ ∑(1−f)ni=(n+1)/2 ((1−f)ni ) items be-
long to {
∣∣∣eˆ(b¯)i
〉
}, while the other M (b) ≡ N −M (b¯) items
belong to {
∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
}. That is
|ψb〉 =
√
M (b)/N
∑
i
(Λ
(b)
i /
√
M (b))
∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
+
√
M (b¯)/N
∑
i
(Λ
(b¯)
i /
√
M (b¯))
∣∣∣eˆ(b¯)i
〉
, (13)
where any Λi can only be ±1 or 0, with
∑
i
Λ
(b)
i =
√
M (b),
∑
i
Λ
(b¯)
i =
√
M (b¯). For example, an n = 5, f = 0.4 state
|11 +−+〉 sealing b = 1 (the first one in Eq.(1) of Ref.
[3]) can be expanded as
|11 +−+〉 = (|11000〉
+ |11001〉 − |11010〉 − |11011〉
+ |11100〉+ |11101〉 − |11110〉
− |11111〉)/
√
8, (14)
where the first item on the right of the equation belongs
to {
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
}, while the other 7 items belong to {
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
}.
Obviously when |ψb〉 is measured honestly, b can be read
correctly with the probability
α =M (b)/N = 1−
(1−f)n∑
i=(n+1)/2
(
(1− f)n
i
)
/2(1−f)n. (15)
On the other hand, a dishonest Bob can always use
the operator P0 =
∑ |c〉 〈c| (sum over all c satisfying
w(c) < n/2) to perform a collective measurement on |ψb〉.
He takes b = 0 whenever the projection is successful, else
he takes b = 1. It can be seen that he can also read b
correctly with the above probability α. The probability β
for the reading to be detected by Alice can be calculated
by repeating the analysis in the previous section. By
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FIG. 1: The security of the majority voting scheme. α is
the probability for Bob to read the bit successfully. β is the
probability for Alice to detect the reading. The solid line
represents β as a function of α. The dashed line represents
α+ β as a function of α.
comparing Eq.(13) with Eq.(1), we find α
(b)
b = M
(b)/N ,
α
(b¯)
b = M
(b¯)/N and α
(2)
b = 0. Substituting them into
Eq.(9) gives
β = α
(b)
b (1− α(b)b ) + α(b¯)b (1 − α(b¯)b )
= 2α(1 − α)
= 2

1−
(1−f)n∑
i=(n+1)/2
(
(1− f)n
i
)
/2(1−f)n


·
(1−f)n∑
i=(n+1)/2
(
(1− f)n
i
)
/2(1−f)n. (16)
Eqs.(15) and (16) clearly show that in the majority
voting scheme, if Alice wants to rise the readability α, the
probability β for her to detect the reading will inevitably
drop no matter how she chooses n and f . Especially,
β → 0 when α → 1. This result as well as the value
of α + β as a function of α are plotted in Fig.1. Thus
we see that without being associated with secret sharing,
the majority voting scheme alone is insecure against the
collective measurement.
B. The scheme that reaches the upper bound
β = 1/2
Eq.(9) indicates that to reach the maximum β = 1/2,
Alice should seal the bit b in the form
|φb ⊗ ψb〉 = (
∑
i
√
λ
(0)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (0)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
+
∑
i
√
λ
(1)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (1)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
)/
√
2. (17)
But clearly such a protocol is useless, since the bit can
only be read correctly with the probability α = 1/2.
Even random guess based on nothing at all can reach
such a probability.
C. The scheme that reaches the upper bound
α+ β = 9/8
Eq.(11) indicates that to reach the maximum α+ β =
9/8, Alice should seal the bit b in the form
|φb ⊗ ψb〉 =
√
3
2
∑
i
√
λ
(b)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (b)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
+
1
2
∑
i
√
λ
(b¯)
b,i
∣∣∣fˆ (b¯)i
〉 ∣∣∣eˆ(b¯)i
〉
. (18)
In this case α = 3/4, β = 3/8. Note that keeping the
system Φ (whose state is described by
∣∣∣fˆi
〉
) at Alice’s side
is important. Otherwise, consider the simplified version
|ψb〉 =
√
3
2
∑
i
√
λ
(b)
b,i
∣∣∣eˆ(b)i
〉
+
1
2
∑
i
√
λ
(b¯)
b,i
∣∣∣eˆ(b¯)i
〉
. (19)
It cannot reach α + β = 9/8 if Bob knows that Alice
has prepared the states this way. This is because the
cheating strategy in the previous section does not re-
quire Bob to know the value of α. If he does, he may
have other optimal strategies to further reduce β. In the
present case, Bob can fake the quantum state with a cer-
tain probability after reading it. For example, if he has
applied P0 on Ψ and the projection fails, he knows that
the state has collapsed to
∑
i
√
λ
(1)
b,i
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
. Since he knows
α, he can use a unitary transformation to shift the state
into
√
1− α∑
i
√
1/N0
∣∣∣eˆ(0)i
〉
+
√
α
∑
i
√
λ
(1)
b,i
∣∣∣eˆ(1)i
〉
(N0 is
the dimensionality of H0). This generally increases his
chance to survive through Alice’s detection. Therefore
the value of α + β in this protocol will be further re-
duced. This is also true for the majority voting scheme
discussed in the section IV.A. If Bob knows f he knows
α from Eq.(15), so that he can further reduce β. But if
there is a system Φ at Alice’s side, it cannot be faked by
Bob. Then changing the state at his own side alone will
be useless and the upperbound could be reached.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The upper bounds β 6 1/2 and α + β 6 9/8 found in
this paper can be seen as an extension of the impossibility
proof of perfect quantum sealing of a classical bit[6]. The
latter can be seen as the special case where α = 1. Eq.(2)
shows that α = 1 means α
(0)
0 = α
(1)
1 = 1 and α
(1)
0 =
α
(2)
0 = α
(0)
1 = α
(2)
1 = 0. Substituting these values into
Eq.(9) immediately gives β = 0.
Due to the existence of these upper bounds, quantum
sealing seems to be far from practical usage, unless we
can find a protocol that cannot be covered by the model
proposed in Section II. However, so far there still has
no sign on the existence of such a protocol. Luckily, as
5mentioned above, our model is limited to the protocols
which seal a single classical bit. The protocol which seals
a classical string[5] is not covered and can be secure.
Very recently, the insecurity of quantum sealing was
also studied by Chau[7], in which a more detailed model
of quantum sealing ({g /∈ G0∪G1} = ∅ and Bob knows α)
was analyzed with a different approach. The result β 6
1/2 was also obtained, which consists with the finding in
the present paper.
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Srikanth and Hoi-Fung Chau for their useful discussions.
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